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NOTES & COMMENTS
FIT TO BE TIED: HOW UNITED STATES V. MICROSOFT
CORP. INCORRECTLY CHANGED THE STANDARD FOR
SHERMAN ACT TYING VIOLATIONS INVOLVING
SOFTWARE
I. INTRODUCTION
Being forced to purchase two things when you only want one seems
inherently wrong. On the other hand, receiving something additional, like
jelly when you buy peanut butter, sounds like a good deal. But what
happens when you do not particularly care for the brand or flavor of bonus
jelly being given to you with the peanut butter? Or, what if you would
rather have something different altogether? Suppose even further that the
store from which you bought the peanut butter would not let you leave
without taking the brand of jelly you despise. Would you still want the
peanut butter?
Fair and open competition is the driving force of America's capitalist
economy.' Through competition, consumers benefit from lower costs,
superior quality, and greater selection.2 In turn, businesses benefit from an
open market and an equal playing field because demand drives down the
overhead costs of production.3 Antitrust laws and their enforcement aim to
promote and protect that competitive process, and the many facets of
antitrust legislation aim to ensure free trade and healthy competition.4
1. Robert Hulse, Note, Patentability of Computer Software After State Street Bank & Trust
Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.: Evisceration of the Subject Matter Requirement, 33 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 491, 494 & n.16 (2000); see also Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994 & Supp. V
1999) (outlawing monopolies that hinder free trade).
2. ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OVERVIEW, at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
overview.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2002).
3. See id.
4. Id.
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One area of antitrust law deals with the "tying"5 of products together
to force the purchaser of one product to acquire an additional product,
whether beneficial or not.6 Until July 2001, courts held that tying
arrangements by a dominant market player were per se invalid if the tying
arrangements hindered free competition in any manner.7 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia modified that rule with
respect to platform software and computer technology (the "Microsoft
Appeal").
Not all tying arrangements are illegal or wrong.9 Firms like Microsoft
frequently tie products together to benefit consumers and achieve more
competitive results.' 0 Similarly, monopolies and monopoly power (if
lawfully acquired) are not per se illegal as violations of antitrust laws. 1 It
is only when a monopolist uses such acquired power to "prevent or
impede" 12 natural competition via tying or other similar restraints that an
antitrust violation occurs.13
This Note proposes that the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia incorrectly changed the tying analysis of antitrust law,
presumably with the intention of protecting the innovative technology
market.' 4  However, the change was unnecessary and, in remanding the
case for determination under the new standard, the court essentially let
Microsoft off without penalty. 15 The district court's break-up order for
Microsoft was invalidated and thus overturned because the appeals court
5. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices § 90 (2000)
[hereinafter Monopolies]. A tying arrangement exists when a seller requires a buyer to purchase
another, less desired product in addition to the desired product, with the potential effect of
hindering competition in the tied product market. Id.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-18 (1984).
8. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 92-95 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The court
found the traditional, four-pronged, per se test for tying claims inapplicable when applied to
platform software because of the potential efficiencies of bundling such software together. Id.
To date, the Supreme Court has not considered the issue. Id. at 95.
9. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 26-29; see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992); see also Monopolies, supra note 5, § 91 (noting
that tying arrangements in concentrated markets can have procompetitive functions).
10. See Todd J. Anlauf, Comment, Severing Ties with the Strained Per Se Test for Antitrust
Tying Liability: The Economic and Legal Rationale for a Rule of Reason, 23 HAMLINE L. REV.
476, 496-97 (2000).
11. See Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1981).
12. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979).
13. Id.
14. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
15. See id. at 95-97.
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failed to apply the new rule of reason test to the district court's findings. 6
Other possible remedies-namely consent decrees-are often ineffective
and more costly than continued litigation.' 7 Thus, when the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that Microsoft violated antitrust
laws and engaged in anticompetitive practices, but did not use this power to
tie products together,' 8 Microsoft was merely branded with a bad name and
nothing more.
This Note demonstrates why a rule of reason analysis for tying
allegations in the software market is unnecessary in light of existing
economic safeguards. Part II provides a background on the tying law as it
has existed to date. Part III analyzes the opinions of the district court and
the court of appeals. Part IV examines how the change in tying law to a
rule of reason analysis with respect to platform software was unnecessary,
overbroad, and let Microsoft escape harsh penalty.
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF CURRENT TYING LAW
Section 1 of the Sherman Act 19 was adopted to prevent businesses
from tying products together. 20 Based on this legislation, a per se test was
adopted to handle claims of tying illegality.2' In 1984, the Supreme Court
in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde22 clarified that a per se
finding of tying illegality should focus on the market in which the
product(s) in question are sold.23 The test remained in effect until the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia addressed
Microsoft's appeal.24
A. Section I of the Sherman Act
Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890, codifying laws created by
judges against unfair competition. 25 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits
16. Id. at 103.
17. Stephen Labaton, US. vs. Microsoft: Going Back to Square One, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
2001, 4:3.
18. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 94-95 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
20. Id. § 1.
21. See generally Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (affirming the use of
the Sherman Act per se test).
22. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
23. Id. at 14-15.
24. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 92-95 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
25. Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional
2002]
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"[e]very contract, combination.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce," irrespective of whether or not the violating party has a
monopoly in the relevant market.2 6 Businesses violate this section of the
Sherman Act most often." When faced with trade restraint questions,
courts have repeatedly condemned commercial strategies that hinder
competition.28  Among such sanctionable strategies are "tying
arrangements" and "exclusive dealing" contracts. 29 A tying situation arises
where a seller agrees to sell one product to a buyer, but only on condition
that the buyer either purchase an additional product (the tied product), or at
a minimum, "agrees that he will not purchase that [or a similar] product
from any other supplier., 30  The contract for sale need not explicitly
embody these arrangements. 3 1 Further, conditions need not be implicitly
embodied in a contract for sale or physical agreement, "but may be
deduced from a course of conduct.
3 2
Anticompetitive arrangements disregard the policy of the Sherman
Act by denying competitors free access to the market for a tied product.3 3
Because the defendant seller in question usually has sufficient power or
leverage in another market to gain access in the tied product market, any
competition is seriously hindered when a business ties its products.3 4
Under established tying law, a tying arrangement violates section 1 of
the Sherman Act only if the seller has significant market power and the
tying arrangement presents a strong hindrance to free competition. 35 Tying
arrangements are per se illegal when several factors are satisfied: (1) the
tying and tied good are two separate products; (2) the tying product's seller
has conditioned the sale upon the purchase of the tied product, thereby
affording consumers no choice but to purchase the tied product; (3) the
seller holds significant power in the market of the tying product; and (4) the
seller's practices have a substantial impact on competition in the relevant
Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 266, 279 (1986).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
27. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1991-2000,
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/7344.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
28. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979).
29. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 46 (D.D.C. 2000).
30. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).




35. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992).
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market.36
The per se test for illegal tying was first introduced in International
Salt Co. v. United States,37 where the Court stated that, "it is unreasonable,
per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market., 38 Five years
later, the court reaffirmed that per se position in Northern Pacific Railway
Co. v. United States.39 At the time of Northern Pacific, new economic
developments cast doubt on the assumption that tying arrangements had no
purpose other than the mere suppression of competition.4 °
This established, per se test will not apply in every tying situation. In
a case where the defendant seller lacks a dominant position in the market of
the tying product, courts employ more economic analysis, weighing and
examining the potential benefits of integration over hindrances to
competition by applying a rule of reason test.41  These situations are
exceptional and thus, "tying arrangements [that hinder competition] can
rarely be harmonized with the strictures of the antitrust laws. 42
B. Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde43 and the Separate
Products Requirement
Jefferson Parish was the first case to give substance to the four-part,
per se test from Northern Pacific, particularly the separate products
inquiry." Jefferson Parish applied a rule of reason approach in examining
the tying allegations-surgical services to listed anesthesiologists.45 At the
same time, the court refused to abolish the long standing per se analysis.46
In doing so, the court asked whether the "character of the demand' is for
two items rather than the mere functional relationship between the items.47
Because there was consumer demand for both surgical services and
36. Id. at 461-62; see also Anlauf, supra note 10, at 480-81.
37. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
38. Id. at 396.
39. 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958).
40. See id. at 6 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949)).
41. See Monopolies, supra note 5, § 90 (noting that without the requisite economic power to
force the consumer to buy the tied product in all cases, further inquiry must be made into the
economics of such a decision to see if the benefits of the tying arrangement outweigh its costs to
competition).
42. Id.
43. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
44. Id. at 21-22.
45. Id.
46. Anlauf, supra note 10, at 492-93 (citing Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15-16).
47. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added).
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anesthesiology, the hospital was tying two separate products by including
its own anesthesiology services with its surgical services.48 Nonetheless,
the court determined that the hospital lacked sufficient market power in the
tying product (hospital and surgical services) to adversely impact
competition in the tied product (anesthesiology) marketplace. 49 Therefore,
even though there had been separate consumer demand, the tying involved
was legal, as it did not hinder competition.50
By focusing on demand for the different products in question, as
opposed to "the functional relation between them,' Jefferson Parish
effectively concluded that even if two items are compliments, or "one ... is
useless without the other, ' '52 they are not necessarily a single product for
purposes of tying law. 53  Adhering to the traditional per se analysis
approach, the court pushed for a case by case analysis by focusing on
economic factors such as price, quality, supply, and demand of both the
tying and tied products. 54 Although Jefferson Parish was the high water
mark for per se illegality of tying claims brought under the Sherman Act,
the decision was mindful of the potential economic benefits that courts
should consider when faced with illegal tying allegations.55
C. A Change in Tying Analysis for an Innovative Market
In a case so heavily laden with technological definitions and
advancements, the D.C. Circuit was troubled in applying a strict Jefferson
Parish per se standard for the tying claims lodged against Microsoft by the
Department of Justice ("D.O.J."). 56 The court in Jefferson Parish proposed
a rule of reason analysis that would enable courts to delve into the
48. Id. at 21-24.
49. Id. at 26-27 (finding that the thirty percent service usage rate of patients in Jefferson
Parish's local area did not constitute a substantial presence in the marketplace).
50. Id. at 32.
51. Id. at 19.
52. Id. at 19 n.30.
53. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19.
54. See id. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Anlauf, supra note 10, at 493-94
(citing Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 31).
55. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 34-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
56. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 946-50 (D.C. Cir. 1998). "Courts
are ill equipped to evaluate the benefits of high-tech product design, and even could they place
such an evaluation on one side of the balance, the strength of the 'evidence of distinct markets,'
proposed for the other side of the scale, seems quite incommensurable." Id. at 952-53 (citation
omitted); see also Anlauf, supra note 10, at 497-98 (explaining the difficulties the court faced
when analyzing the integration of Microsoft bundling).
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economics behind tying decisions,57 and the circuit court implemented that
suggestion.58
The tying claim against Microsoft arose from its practice of
integrating Internet Explorer (IE), its Internet browser, into Windows, its
operating system software.5 9  Though it seems minor, the fact that
Microsoft controlled more than ninety percent of the Intel-based computer
market caused such "bundling" to have a severe effect on competition,
forcing all competitors to offer their Internet browsers free of charge like
Microsoft. 60 Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit was also aware that tying
benefited the market, the consumer, and even the industry.6' Therefore,
upon the case's return to the court of appeals, the Microsoft Appeal court
was willing to change the rule because Microsoft's situation "offer[ed] the
first up-close look at the technological integration of added functionality
into software that serves as a platform for third-party applications. 62
III. THE CASE AGAINST MICROSOFT
A. Factual Background
In 1998, the D.O.J. filed a tying claim against Microsoft, 63 alleging
that the bundling of IE 3.0 and IE 4.0 with Windows 95 and Windows 98
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.64  The allegations claimed that
57. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
59. Id. at 58.
60. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19-20 (D.D.C. 1999) ("For the last
couple of years, the [market share] figure has been at least ninety-five percent, and analysts
project that the share will climb even higher over the next few years."); see also United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining that in certain circumstances, the
Supreme Court has held that a price could be "unlawfully low" or predatory).
61. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 950-51 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Incorporating browsing functionality into the operating system allows applications to
avail themselves of that functionality without starting up a separate browser
application. Further, components of IE 3.0 and even more IE 4 ... provide system
services not directly related to Web browsing, enhancing the functionality of a wide
variety of applications.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
62. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[S]implistic
application of per se tying rules carries a serious risk of harm.").
63. Complaint at 6-7, United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No.
98-1232), available at http://,ww.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/fl700/1763.pdf.
64. Id. at 48.
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Microsoft's tying arrangements violated a previous consent decree settling
similar antitrust claims against Microsoft.65 The litigation arose from the
D.O.J.'s claim that Microsoft violated a 1994 order, pursuant to that
consent decree, "by continuing to tie Windows and IE in its sale [licensing]
to both OEMs [Original Equipment Manufacturers] and consumers. 66 By
1998, Microsoft's Internet browser market share doubled from thirty
percent at the release of Windows 95 to sixty percent after the release of
Windows 98.67
The district court scheduled the case on a "fast track" 68 as technology
and the relevant market is ever changing. 69 After a seventy-six day bench
trial, the district court found that Microsoft had a substantial hold on the
operating system and Internet browser market, and had acted in a
monopolistic manner by bundling its software to OEMs.7° Subsequently,
the parties engaged in settlement talks before a mediator.7' With no
settlement after four months of negotiations, the district court issued its
conclusions of law on April 3, 2000.72 Those conclusions led to the appeal
at issue in this Note.
B. The District Court Decision in United States v. Microsoft Corp.73
The district court held that Microsoft violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act by unlawfully tying its Web browser (IE) to its operating
system (Windows).74 The court based its decision on the per se analysis
65. Id. at 17.
66. Anlauf, supra note 10, at 496-97. "Specifically, the Windows 95 and Internet Explorer
3.0 software was bundled by a contract which required Original Equipment Manufacturers
(OEMs) to purchase and install Internet Explorer, the tied product, in order to receive the
ubiquitous Windows product." Id. at 496 (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d
9, 98 (D.D.C. 1999)).
67. Id. at 497.
68. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The district court
consolidated the preliminary injunction hearing and trial on the merits and then set a trial date
only four months away from the time complaints had been filed. Id. In addition, the district court
planned to limit each side to a maximum of twelve witnesses whose direct testimony was to come
from written declarations. Id.
69. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
70. Id.; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999).
71. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 47-48 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("The Honorable
Richard A. Posner, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
was appointed to serve as mediator.").
72. Id. at 48.
73. 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
74. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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adopted and modified by the Supreme Court in the Jefferson Parish
Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde75 and Northern Pacific Railway Co. v.
United States76 decisions. 7
1. IE and Windows as Two Separate Products
Microsoft asserted that the tied and tying products, the operating
system and browser respectively, were really just a single product.78 Citing
Jefferson Parish, the district court held that consumer demand would be the
appropriate test and, as opposed to Microsoft's perception, "consumers
today perceive operating systems and browsers as separate 'products,' for
which there is separate demand.,79 Keeping with Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services8 0 and Jefferson Parish, the court was unwilling
to allow Microsoft's "valid business reasons" to stand in the way of
liability. 8' Thus, the D.O.J. satisfied the first element of the test-that the
tied and tying products be two distinct products in the eyes of consumers as
evidenced by separate consumer demand.
82
2. The Conditioned Sale of IE with Windows Afforded the Consumer No
Choice
The district court found that Microsoft mandated OEMs install IE on
all new computers pursuant to the licensing agreement for Windows.
83
Microsoft was also found to have refused licenses to OEMs for Windows
distribution unless they agreed not to remove IE icons from the Windows
75. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
76. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
77. See generally Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. 2 (formulating the idea that per se analysis is
appropriate only in cases where the defendant has established market dominance); N. Pac. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
78. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 48 (D.D.C. 2000).
79. Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
80. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
81. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 48 (D.D.C. 2000).
Thus, at a minimum, the admonition of the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft II [Microsoft
Appeal for purposes of this Note] to refrain from any product design assessment as to
whether the "integration" of Windows and Internet Explorer is a "net plus," deferring
to Microsoft's "plausible claim" that it is of "some advantage" to consumers, is at odds
with the Supreme Court's own approach.
Id. at 48-49.
82. See id. at 49.
83. Id. at 50; see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 49-51 (D.D.C.
1999).
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desktop. 4 Relating the issue directly to customers, the district court held
that Microsoft had forced consumers to acquire IE with the purchase of
Windows.85 When consumers received computers with Windows and IE
already installed from OEMs, they were unable to remove IE, even if they
so desired.86 In this regard, irrespective of Microsoft's claims that IE was
included at no charge, the court held that Microsoft forced customers to
"pay" for the tied product.87
3. Microsoft Holds Significant Power in the Browser Market
The court defined the market in question as that of Intel-compatible
personal computer ("PC") operating systems.88 Searching for "appreciable
economic power in the tying market," the district court followed the
analysis of Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.89 and
Jefferson Parish.90 After holding Microsoft had a monopoly in the
operating system market, the court applied the conclusion in Fortner that
market power is the ability to tie products together. 9' The court held, a
fortiori, that Microsoft had significant power in the browser market for
purposes of the third prong of per se tying analysis.92 The court was
therefore unwilling to consider the argument that Microsoft did not have a
monopoly over the Internet browser market.
84. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 50 (D.D.C. 2000).
85. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 49-51 (D.D.C. 1999).
86. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 50 (D.D.C. 2000).
87. Id. (holding that, even though there is no additional cost for IE over Windows,
"licensees, including consumers, are forced to take, and pay for, the entire package of software
and. . . any value to be ascribed to Internet Explorer is built into this single price"); see also
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84-85 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999)) (In certain circumstances, "Microsoft designed
Windows 98 to override the user's choice of default web browser .... ).
88. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 49 (D.D.C. 2000).
89. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
90. Id. See generally Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14 (defining market power as the ability
"to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive market"); Fortner,
394 U.S. at 504 (holding the ability to raise prices or merely impose tie-ins on any appreciable
number of buyers within the relevant market as significant for market power analysis).
91. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 37 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding that
Microsoft had a persistent market share "protected by a substantial barrier to entry" and a failure
to rebut evidence that effectively showed "indicia of monopoly power" compelled a finding of
monopoly power).
92. Id. at 49.
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4. Microsoft's Bundling Actions Foreclosed a Substantial Amount of
Commerce
Citing the Fortner decision, the district court applied a substantiality
test, based on a "'total amount of business' that is 'substantial enough in
terms of dollar-volume so as not to be merely de minimis .... , 93  The
court, looking to its findings of fact,9 4 held that although there was no
specified dollar amount of foreclosed business, Microsoft's bundling
practices caused Netscape Navigator's "usage share to drop substantially
from 1995 to 1998." 9' As such, it was "obvious" to the district court that
Microsoft's refusal to offer IE separate from Windows exceeded the de
minimis threshold laid down by the Supreme Court in Fortner.
96
5. The Result of a Tying Conclusion
Having satisfied the four prongs of the Northern Pacific Railway Co.
and Jefferson Parish per se tying test, the district court held that Microsoft
continuously and illegally tied IE to Windows, in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act.97 However, the court remained mindful that such a test
might be inappropriate for the technology-based subject matter, yet found
itself bound to follow Supreme Court precedent.98
These conclusions, coupled with the holding that Microsoft
established and maintained a monopoly power, led the district court to
order the software giant to break into two separate businesses. 99 Microsoft
was supposed to separate into an Operating Systems Business to handle the
Windows operating systems, and an Applications Business to handle all
other applications, including IE.'00 The idea was that splitting Microsoft
93. Id. (quoting Fortner, 394 U.S. at 501).
94. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999).
95. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 49 (D.D.C. 2000) ("[A]s a direct
result [of the usage drop] Netscape suffered a severe drop in revenues from lost advertisers, Web
traffic and purchases of server products.").
96. Id. at 49-50.
97. Id. at 51, 56 (holding that "Microsoft's decision to offer only the bundled-
'integrated'-version of Windows and Internet Explorer derived not from technical necessity or
business efficiencies [but rather from] the result of a deliberate and purposeful choice to quell
incipient competition before it reached truly minatory proportions," violated section 1).
98. Id. "A court mechanically applying a strict 'separate demand' test could improvidently
wind up condemning 'integrations' that represent genuine improvements to software that are
benign from the standpoint of consumer welfare and a competitive market." Id.
99. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63-64 (D.D.C. 2000).
100. Id. at 64.
2002]
594 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:583
would force it to license with itself to obtain an Internet browser for
Windows. Accordingly, the corporation would be unable to tie the
products together, allowing other Internet browsers to compete with the
Applications Business to be included in Windows.' 1 1 However, this result
only worked in theory.
C. The D.C. Circuit Decision in United States v. Microsoft Corp.
10 2
The circuit court reversed the district court's decision that Microsoft
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, holding that the district court
inaccurately applied the per se test. 10 3 The court first reviewed the district
court's application of the per se test, determining that some of the elements
were not as easily satisfied as the district court had found. 10 4 The court
then held that a per se test was inapplicable to the technological subject
matter at issue. °5
1. The District Court Misapplied the Separate Products Prong of the Per Se
Test to Microsoft's Bundling Practices
Although the district court applied all four prongs of the per se test
from Northern Pacific Railway Co.,10 6 the circuit court focused its
objection on the application of the second prong: separate product
analysis.'0 7 The core concern behind the Jefferson Parish consumer
demand test for the "two distinct products" prong of the per se test was that
"tying prevents goods from competing directly for consumer choice on
their merits.' 1 8  As there are potential benefits from tying/bundling,
101. See id. at 65-66. Microsoft was to maintain these as entirely separate businesses
whereby the Operating Systems Business would have to license applications from the
Applications Business or from competitors, as if it had no ties with the Applications Business. Id.
102. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
103. Id. at 84 (vacating the district court's finding of a per se tying violation).
104. Id. at 84-89.
105. Id. at 89-90. "[T]here are strong reasons to doubt that the integration of additional
software functionality into an [operating system] falls among these [per se invalid tying]
arrangements." Id. at 89.
106. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 49-50 (D.D.C. 2000).
107. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85-89 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
108. Id. at 87.
Direct competition on the merits of the tied product is foreclosed when the tying
product either is sold only in a bundle with the tied product or, though offered
separately, is sold at a bundled price, so that the buyer pays the same price whether he
takes the tied product or not.
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Jefferson Parish developed a separate products test as a rough guideline "to
screen out false positives." 109 By not focusing on consumer demand, a
court would only look at whether two products were involved, thereby
ignoring any potential benefit of bundling.'10
Though the district court found that many consumers, if given the
option, would choose to purchase or acquire Internet browsers separately
from operating systems,"' the court did not discuss any evidence of
whether other operating system vendors sold browsers and their systems at
bundled prices. 12  Indeed, if all competing operating system vendors
bundled Internet browsers with their software, or vice-versa, then the goods
would be known as a "single product" under the Jefferson Parish test.' 13
However, Microsoft's argument failed because there were no operating
systems on the market to which a browser could be tied that would have
been strong enough to compete with Windows.
1 14
The circuit court emphasized that perceivable separate demand by
consumers was "inversely proportional to net efficiencies" of tying. 5
Hence, bundling by all competitive firms within a certain market suggested
that there were strong net efficiencies for the process, outweighing any
noticeable separate demand. 1 6  Therefore, Microsoft's practices would
have been consistent with any competition (as the entire "competitive
fringe" was engaging in the same behavior) and, thus, not in violation of
section 1, even though consumer demand was for two separate products."
17
The circuit court decided that the district court inappropriately applied the
"separate products" prong of the per se test because it failed to take the
potential economic efficiencies of Microsoft's bundling practices into
account.1
18
109. Id. ("The consumer demand test is a rough proxy for whether a tying arrangement may,
on balance, be welfare-enhancing, and unsuited to per se condemnation.").
110. Id. at 87-88.
111. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 48 (D.D.C. 1999).
112. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
113. Id. at 86. This is true because there would be no separate demand.
114. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding that
Microsoft established and maintained a monopoly in the computer operating systems market for
Intel-based computers).
115. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2001). "Only when the
efficiencies from bundling are dominated by the benefits [of] choice for enough consumers,
however, will we actually observe consumers making independent purchases." Id. at 87.
116. Id. at 88.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 87-89.
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2. The Per Se Tying Test Was the Wrong Test Because It Was Inapplicable
to the Subject Matter
The circuit court was convinced that specific situations required a per
se tying test to invalidate unreasonable actions that posed an undesirable
danger of encumbering competition.119 The court was also aware that
integration of additional software into operating systems on compatible
platforms was most likely not one of those situations. 120  Thus, the court
held that applying a per se test "off the shelf' was inappropriate given the
content of the products at issue. 121
The circuit court's major concern was the speed of the technology
markets and the possibility that bundling would accomplish efficiencies
and benefits that courts had never seen before.122  Microsoft argued that
integration of IE into Windows was not only beneficial and innovative
because no .other company invested the resources to incorporate a web
browser as deeply into its operating system as Microsoft, but also that such
integration required the non-removal of IE. 123  Mindful that, unlike
monopoly maintenance claims, a separate products inquiry under Jefferson
Parish is supposed to proceed without an efficiency analysis, the court held
that "looking to a competitive fringe is inadequate to evaluate fully its
potentially innovative technological integration .... ,,124 Because the
Jefferson Parish separate products test was not suited to an
efficiency/benefit analysis, the court held that applying such a test to
Microsoft's situation would be detrimental to consumers by chilling
innovation.1
25
Recognizing that most computer tying and bundling cases dealt with
bundling software with hardware, 126 the circuit court noted that the
119. Id. at 89.
120. Id. at 89-90 ("Applying per se analysis to such an amalgamation creates undue risks of
error and of deterring welfare-enhancing innovation.").
121. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89-90 (D.C. Cir. 2001). "[T]he paucity
of cases examining software bundling suggests a high risk that per se analysis may produce
inaccurate results..." Id. at 92.
122. Id. at 90-91.
123. Id. at 88-89.
124. Id. at 89 (noting that such a comparison is "between apples and oranges").
125. Id. at 89 ("The per se rule's direct consumer demand and indirect industry custom
inquiries are, as a general matter, backward-looking and therefore systematically poor proxies for
overall efficiency in the presence of new and innovative integration.").
126. Id. at 91-92 (noting that there were merely four cases--one of which was the D.C.
Circuit opinion in United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998)--that
involved an arrangement in which "a software program is tied to the purchase of a software
FIT TO BE TIED
Supreme Court had not applied the per se test to the growing software
market.' 27  Accordingly, the circuit court was careful not to discard
Microsoft's arguments without consideration. 128 Microsoft conceded that
IE was fully integrated and non-removable from Windows, but the
company proposed that integration was necessary to foster innovation
instead of hindering growth.1 29  Taking this argument into account, the
D.C. Circuit chose to abandon the rigid per se test under section 1 of the
Sherman Act in cases of "platform software."'
' 30
The court held that in technology cases, such as those involving
platform software, a rule of reason analysis would afford the most
opportunity for a defendant, like Microsoft, to demonstrate the efficiency
gain from its tie or bundle.13' A rule of reason analysis was particularly
important in the platform software market because integration is common
in such markets, even among firms without market power.1
32
Unfortunately, the court said little on what such a test should entail beyond
an inquiry into the individual costs and benefits in each case.
133
The circuit court did not want to apply a rule of reason test in lieu of
the standard Jefferson Parish per se rule in all cases where an efficiency
justification for tying arrangements exists. 134 However, the court clarified
that when the product in question is platform software, the per se test will
not work to better the economy. 135 Therefore, even though the circuit court
platform").
127. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 90 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
128. See id.
129. Id. (noting that Microsoft argued that the "bundling of [IE] APIs with Windows makes
the latter a better applications platform for third-party software").
130. Id. at 94.
131. Id. at 92 (holding that "the nature of the platform software market affirmatively
suggests that per se rules might stunt valuable innovation."). Additionally, the court felt that
there may be many real efficiencies "common in technologically dynamic markets where product
development is especially unlikely to follow an easily foreseen linear pattern," which may be
ignored by a rigid application of a per se rule for tying. Id. at 94.
132. Id. at 92-93. This point bolstered the court's argument for looking at the economics
behind integration in such a market in that firms without market power could not possibly have
any incentive to bundle their products "unless there are efficiency gains from doing so." Id.
133. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The court hinted
elsewhere in the opinion that the inquiry into the business excuse and redeeming virtues put
forward by one accused of "tying" in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act should be
"elaborate." See id. at 90-91.
134. Id. at 94.
135. Id. at 94-95. "[I]ntegration of new functionality into platform software is a common
practice and... wooden application of per se rules in this litigation may cast a cloud over
platform innovation in the market for PCs, network computers and information appliances." Id.
at 95.
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upheld the district court's finding that Microsoft illegally acquired and
maintained monopoly power, it ultimately reversed the finding of an illegal
tie based on the fact that the per se test was inapplicable.
136
3. Remand of the Tying Claim
In remanding the tying claim back to the district court for
consideration under the revised rule of reason standard, the circuit court
gave three guidelines as to what the D.O.J. needed to show.
137
First, the D.O.J. would bear the burden of proving that the "actual
effect" of Microsoft's conduct unreasonably restrained competition by
inquiring into the "actual effect"' 138 of Microsoft's conduct on rivals in the
tied good market that unreasonably restrained competition. 39 In order to
prove this, the D.O.J. would have to provide a definition of the browser
market and barriers to entry into that market other than the tying
arrangement itself.140  However, the court held that the D.O.J. failed to
provide such a definition or show these barriers in their section 2 Sherman
Act monopolization claim. Therefore, on remand, the D.O.J. could not
argue any theory of harm that depended on a clear-cut definition of
browsers or barriers to entry other than what may have been implicit in
Microsoft's tying arrangement.' 41  The court further held that any
efficiency argument proffered by Microsoft for the bundling was the
D.O.J.'s burden to disprove.
142
Second, the court maintained that Microsoft's violations of section 2
of the Sherman Act did not bear on the tying claim even though some of
the behavior in support of that finding alleged tying violations. 143 For this
behavior to constitute a section 1 tying violation, the D.O.J.-should it
have chosen to pursue the tying claim-would have needed to show that
136. Id.
137. Id. at 95-96.
138. Id. at 95.
139. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 95-96 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Jefferson
Parish, 466 U.S. at 29).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 95. This had the effect of telling the D.O.J. that the only way it could show a
barrier was to show that the products were tied, a fact already established by the trial court. See
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 49 (D.D.C. 1999).
142. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
143. Id. (holding that those findings of including IE with Windows and not allowing
manufacturers or consumers to remove IE were the "basis for liability under plaintiffs' § 2
monopoly maintenance claim," but could not be used to show restraint of competition or barrier
to entry in the tied product market, namely Internet browsers).
FIT TO BE TIED
the benefits of bundling and permanence of IE on the computer, if any,
were wholly "outweighed by the harms in the tied product market."'
144
Finally, the circuit court held that to find a section 1 tying violation,
the district court, on remand, would have to consider whether Microsoft
"price bundl[ed]"' 145 IE and Windows, and whether this price bundling had
any impact on the browser market. 146 This last requirement involves first
finding that Microsoft charged more for Windows and IE together than it
charged for Windows alone. 147  If the court finds a price increase in
Windows as bundled with IE, then the D.O.J. bears the burden of proving
that the anticompetitive effects of such price bundling outweighs any of
Microsoft's justifications. 4 8 The circuit court made clear that in applying
the rule of reason test, lower courts were free to look at both direct and
indirect evidence stemming from a tie. 1
49
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE PER SE TEST IN UNITED
STATES V. MICROSOFT CORP. 5
A. Mandating the Rule of Reason Analysis in All Software Tying
Allegations Is Unnecessary
1. Rule of Reason Analysis
The circuit court formulated a rule of reason analysis to replace the
per se tying test-specifically the separate-products prong-when faced
with tying allegations involving platform software.151 This type of analysis
was necessary because the per se method announced in Jefferson Parish
Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde 52 failed to fully account for the economics




148. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The circuit court
went on to declare that if price bundling were proven by competitive operating system makers,
this would "tend to exonerate Microsoft only if the sellers in question sold their browser/OS
[operating system] combinations exclusively at a bundled price." Id. at 97.
149. Id. at 96 (noting that a separate-products analysis would merely serve as a screening
device to classify arrangements as subject to tying law, but not to find liability thereunder).
150. 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
151. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
152. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
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potentially associated with the bundling of such software.153 Though the
per se tying test has had its share of criticism, 154 this change by the circuit
court was unwarranted, and has actually hurt the consumer more than it has
helped.
A rule of reason analysis of a tying allegation is proper when "the
defendant seller does not possess sufficient market power to force
customers to purchase a second, unwanted product in order to obtain the
tying product... .""' In this situation, courts emphasize the purposes and
effects of the bundling practices involved, given that the defendant seller is
without the standard market power required for the per se test.1
56
Jefferson Parish helped distinguish between the per se and rule of
reason analyses.157 In a situation where a defendant charged with illegal
tying has a great deal of leverage in a market, making an inquiry into actual
market conditions unnecessary, per se analysis is appropriate because the
existence of forcing by the defendant is more than likely.'58 Therefore, in
circumstances where the defendant seller is clearly in a dominant position
to engage in "anticompetitive conduct," 159 a court can avoid the
burdensome costs of analyzing market conditions. 160 On the other hand, a
rule of reason inquiry into tying allegations allows a court to examine the
potential benefits of certain bundling agreements by investigating the
economic market, but at the expense of increased litigation inherent in a
case-by-case inquiry. 16 1 Judges are able to further develop the pro and
anticompetitive effects of a tying allegation under a rule of reason
inquiry. 162
2. Per Se Analysis Is Generally a Misnomer
Courts do not apply the per se analysis under section 1 of the
Sherman Act 163 in a typical per se manner. Rather, they simply avoid
153. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 93-94 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
154. See, e.g., Anlauf, supra note 10, at 479, 499-509.
155. Monopolies, supra note 5, § 92.
156. Id.
157. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14-18.
158. Id. at 15-16 ("[A]s a threshold matter there must be a substantial potential for impact
on competition in order to justify per se condemnation.").
159. Id. at 15-16 & n.25.
160. Id. at 15 n.25.
161. See Anlauf, supra note 10, at 508-09.
162. Id. at 509.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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inquiry into market conditions and label this a per se test. 164 The majority
of typical per se rules in other areas of antitrust law simply avoid inquiry
into market structure altogether, "because the challenged conduct has so
little chance of being economically beneficial and so great a likelihood of
being economically harmful .. , However, in the context of illegal
tying allegations, courts examine the tying-product market structure,
because tying arrangements in competitive markets are not necessarily
dangerous and unlawful themselves. 166 Courts focus their inquiries on the
relevant marketplace to ensure that legitimate tying or bundling conduct is
not condemned as illegal.
67
As mentioned above, 168 the threshold for application of a Jefferson
Parish per se analysis is market dominance.' 69 Even so, once a plaintiff
establishes market dominance and per se analysis is proper, the court must
still look into the tying product's market structure. 170  Per se illegality of
tying practices is truly "per se" only when the defendant corporation truly
dominates the marketplace, making lengthy inquiry into market conditions,
on balance, unnecessary.171
Courts should always question market structure and explore potential
economic benefits, even if their analysis is minimal. 72 Therefore, further
inquiry into potential economic benefits under a rule of reason analysis is
justified only when the defendant corporation-alleged to have tied
products illegally-has no market power. 173
164. Monopolies, supra note 5, § 91.
165. Id.
166. Id.; see also Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d
468, 495-96 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that without anticompetitive conduct, a tying arrangement in
a competitive marketplace is not illegal in and of itself), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 868 (1992).
167. See Monopolies, supra note 5, § 91. Without inquiry into the relevant market structure,
a true per se test would overlook those "tying arrangements in concentrated markets [that] may
serve procompetitive purposes, such as quality control, production and sales efficiencies, and the
facilitation of indirect price competition." Id.
168. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
169. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15-18.
170. Monopolies, supra note 5, § 91.
17 1. See id. § 92; see also Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15-18.
172. Monopolies, supra note 5, § 91 (noting that there must, at the very least, be an inquiry
as to whether the corporate defendant possesses sufficient market power to warrant application of
the Jefferson Parish per se test).
173. See id. § 92.
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3. Rule of Reason Is Therefore Appropriate in Very Limited Circumstances
The rule of reason allows a court the opportunity to delve into the
economic market and explore the potential benefits bundling may provide
the industry and consumers in a case where market dominance is not clear
and anticompetitive elements are not established. 74  As previously
mentioned, even the per se test incorporates some economic analysis in an
investigation of tying allegations. However, courts limit their inquiry
where a plaintiff establishes market dominance. 175  Thus, the difference
between the tests is that under the rule of reason test, a plaintiff is not
required to show that the seller of a tied product has sufficient market
power.176
The rule of reason test gives more deference to the defendant seller
who is not a dominant force because he lacks leverage in the market in
question. 7 7 On the other hand, the per se inquiry looks to the economic
benefit of product integration, but is wary of any benefit a dominant seller
could provide the consumer or industry. 178  After all, section 1 of the
Sherman Act does not criminalize tying arrangements themselves, but only
those that impose restraints on trade. 1
79
The fact that there are so many new software companies with multiple
innovative products 18 means that relatively few will have the necessary
market power to require a per se analysis of any bundling practice.'
Because of their lack of market dominance, the majority of software
companies will be subject to a rule of reason inquiry with special attention
paid to the unfamiliar platform software market. 182  Therefore, the
Microsoft Appeal court correctly pushed for a rule of reason investigation
in a typical platform software context. 183 The Jefferson Parish per se rule,
174. See id.
175. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1-2; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 34 n.1 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). "The 'per se' doctrine in tying cases has thus always required an elaborate
inquiry into the economic effects of the tying arrangement." Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 34.
176. Monopolies, supra note 5, § 92.
177. See id.
178. See Monopolies, supra note 5, § 91.
179. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 27 ("Tying arrangements need only be condemned if
they restrain competition on the merits by forcing purchases that would not otherwise be made.").
180. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
181. See Monopolies, supra note 5, § 92 (where the defendant seller is without the dominant
market power as required by the per se test, further inquiry will be made into the relevant product
markets to see if, in fact, tying of the products is beneficial to consumers rather than hurtful).
182. See id.
183. Id. at 92.
FIT TO BE TIED
if applied to the majority of these companies, would condemn innovative
and efficient behavior all too often.
184
However, the Microsoft Appeal proposal that rule of reason was
appropriate across the board' 85 was incorrect. Though the platform
software market is relatively new and uncharted by the Supreme Court,' 86 a
holding that rule of reason analysis is necessary in all tying allegations in
that market is too broad.'87 The rule of reason approach in all claims of
tying illegality suffers from many problems, including ambiguity, increased
litigation costs, and unpredictability. 188 Due to these shortcomings, courts
should only apply a rule of reason survey in situations where a lengthy
inquiry into market structure and market conditions is warranted. 89 The
Microsoft Appeal conclusion will only cause confusion and unnecessary
litigation in cases that courts should swiftly resolve under the per se rule.
B. Per Se Analysis was Appropriate for Microsoft
1. The Circuit Court Incorrectly Applied Rule of Reason Analysis in
United States v. Microsoft Corp.'9o
The circuit court correctly proposed that in some cases-especially in
the growing software market, where technology constantly evolves--courts
should examine tying claims under a rule of reason inquiry.' 91 However,
Microsoft cannot and should not benefit from further economic inquiry into
potential benefits of its integration of Windows and IE. Microsoft
established market dominance and further maintained that dominance by
barring competitors' entrance into the relevant markets, namely operating
systems and Internet browsers.' 92 As such, the court should have applied
184. Id.; see also Monopolies, supra note 5, § 90 (The per se test would ignore any offered
market efficiency arguments and note only that these groundbreaking companies had a dominant
position in a new marketplace.); Monopolies, supra note 5, § 92.
185. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
186. Id. at 93.
187. See id. at 92 ("The nature of the platform software market affirmatively suggests that
per se rules might stunt valuable innovation.").
188. Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future ofAmerican Antitrust Policy,
75 CAL. L. REV. 797, 800 (1987).
189. See Monopolies, supra note 5, § 92 (explaining that if no one seller possesses sufficient
market power, it is too difficult to utilize a per se approach).
190. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
191. Id. at 92.
192. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999).
2002]
604 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:583
the per se test, as laid out in Jefferson Parish, requiring the court to be
mindful yet skeptical of any benefits Microsoft proposed for its bundling
practices. 193
Beyond mere market power, the district court found that Microsoft
had an established monopoly in both the operating system and web browser
markets. 194 The circuit court incorrectly reversed the per se tying violation
and remanded the case to the district court to apply a rule of reason
inquiry. 95 Microsoft is neither a new corporation nor one creating a new
marketplace. 196  Microsoft holds a firm grasp over the operating system
market with Windows. 197 The fact that there is virtually no alternative to
Windows suggests that Microsoft has cornered the operating systems
market. 198 In doing so, Microsoft used its dominance and leverage to push
new products onto consumers through anticompetitive means.1 99
The threshold question as to whether the court should apply the rule
of reason or the per se analysis turns on the defendant's dominance in the
tying product market.200  The D.O.J. centered its illegal tying allegations
against Microsoft on Microsoft's bundling of IE with Windows. 201 Given
Microsoft's dominance in the operating system market, there is no question
that per se analysis is the correct approach. As stated above, the district
court found that Microsoft had and maintained a monopoly position in the
operating systems market with Windows.20 2 Therefore, under Jefferson
Parish, the district court's per se inquiry was proper for Microsoft because
the corporation held a dominant position in the Windows market and used
that dominance to move "economic power from one market [operating
systems] to another [Internet browsers] ....,203
193. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15-18 (laying out a four-prong per se test when
courts are faced with a tying allegation).
194. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F.- Supp. 2d 30, 47-48 (D.D.C. 2000).
195. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
196. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999) (explaining
that "[e]very year for the last decade, Microsoft's share of the market for Intel-compatible PC
operating systems has stood above ninety percent").
197. Id.
198. Id. at 24.
199. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64-65 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (requiring that
OEMs install IE on every Windows system as default browser).
200. See Monopolies, supra note 5, § 92.
201. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
202. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999).
203. Monopolies, supra note 5, § 90 (Leverage of power is the focus of per se inquiry as
tying arrangements are not by themselves anticompetitive or illegal.).
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The circuit court incorrectly held that rule of reason is the preferred
method of analysis for all tying claims dealing with platform software
products.2 °4 The court couched its holding on the theory that because the
technology was "pervasively innovative, ' 20 5 courts would be unable to
effectively inquire into the potential benefits of software bundling.20 6 This
rationale downplays judicial ability and gives monopolist corporations, like
Microsoft, a windfall. Certainly, the court should have more deeply
explored the potential efficiencies of bundling IE with Windows, but this
could have been accomplished under the per se test as applied by the
district court.20 7 The circuit court was therefore wrong in holding that rule
of reason was the appropriate test.
2. Microsoft's Bundling Practices Are a Per Se Violation of the Sherman
Act
Under a per se analysis, the district court properly found Microsoft's
bundling of Windows and IE to be a violation of the Sherman Act.208 The
circuit court was wrong in holding that a rule of reason test should have
been applied.20 9 The district court properly scrutinized Microsoft's actions
under a per se approach because Microsoft had established and maintained
a monopoly position in the operating systems market and then used this
leverage to push IE onto consumers.210
a. Microsoft Had Dominant Power in the Operating System Market
The district court correctly concluded that Microsoft had "'market
power' in the tying product [operating systems] market., 211  Microsoft
controlled the Intel-compatible PC operating systems market, leaving very
little room, if any, for competition.21 2 Relying on Rothery Storage & Van
Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.,213 the district court held that the definition of
204. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
205. Id. at 93.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 84-85 (concluding that the district court's per se analysis was incorrect).
208. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 47-48 (D.D.C. 2000).
209. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
210. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 44 (D.D.C. 1999).
211. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 47-51 (D.D.C. 2000).
212. Id. at 36.
213. 792 F.2d 210, 218 (D.C.C. 1986).
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relevant market turns on available substitutes.214 Finding no current
products that consumers could effectively substitute for Windows, nor any
potential substitutes for Microsoft's dominant operating system, the district
court held that Microsoft had significant market power on which to base
per se liability.2 5  Having established Microsoft's market power in the
tying product market (Windows), 216 the district court then moved to the
remaining elements of the per se test.
b. Windows and IE Are Two Distinct Products
The district court properly held that Microsoft's tying and tied goods
were two separate products under the first prong of the Jefferson Parish
inquiry. 7 Under Jefferson Parish, a plaintiff proves the separate products
element by showing that there was distinct consumer demand for each of
the products or services, independent of one another.1 8 Consumer demand
is a rough means of looking into the market structure of the tied product to
determine whether or not there is a benefit to the bundling practice.219
Examining the Internet browser market, the district court found that most
consumers, if given the option, would choose their browser separately from
their operating system.220 The court's finding is further evidenced by the
fact that apart from the Windows operating system, there is virtually no
other operating system to which other browsers could be tied.221
The circuit court, however, stated that the consumer demand
inquiry-because of its backward-looking nature-ignored possible
efficiencies that may have resulted from "innovative integration. 222
Nonetheless, the fact that Microsoft made IE irremovable from Windows
justified the district court's application of the separate consumer demand
inquiry for browsers and operating systems.223 Though Microsoft argued
that irremovability was necessary because no other company invested the
214. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36 (D.D.C. 2000).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 37.
217. Id.; see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
461-62 (1992) (applying the first prong of the Jefferson Parish test).
218. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21-22.
219. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
220. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 48 (D.D.C. 1999).
221. See id. at 13-14 (finding that Windows enjoyed ninety-five percent popularity for
Intel-compatible computers in 1998 and that no products exist that a "significant percentage of
consumers" could substitute for Windows).
222. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
223. See id. at 88.
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same amount of resources into integration, the argument failed to reflect
the fact that Microsoft dominated the operating system market.224 Indeed,
Microsoft used the fact that it had a monopoly in operating systems to push
its own Internet browser on consumers and attempt to drive competitors
such as Sun Microsystems and Netscape out of business.
225
"Jefferson Parish proxies" would not, as the circuit court supposed,
ignore integration efficiencies. 226  However, given its dominance in the
operating system market, Microsoft carried more of a burden to prove these
efficiencies than would a non-monopolist corporation.227 Similarly, even if
Microsoft argued that integration of IE into Windows was necessary for
functional purposes, both Jefferson Parish and Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services228 rejected this "functional linkage" argument.229
In fact, Jefferson Parish stated that two distinct products could exist even if
one was completely "useless without the other.,
230
The Jefferson Parish per se approach thus allows the court to reach
the same results as with the rule of reason, namely that Microsoft had a
monopoly in operating systems and was using that power to push its
Internet browser on consumers. 231 However, the per se inquest eliminates
excessive amounts of time and money required by the market examination
under a rule of reason investigation.
c. Consumers Are Forced to Purchase the Tied and Tying Products
Together
Microsoft's bundling of IE to Windows is per se invalid under the
second prong of the Jefferson Parish analysis 232 in that consumers have no
choice but to purchase the tied product along with Windows.233 Through
224. Id. at 88-89.
225. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 17-19 (D.D.C. 1999).
226. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
227. Id.
228. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
229. Norman W. Hawker, Consistently Wrong: The Single Product Issue and the Tying
Claims Against Microsoft, 35 CAL. W. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1998).
230. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19 & n.30.
231. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999) ("Microsoft
enjoys so much power in the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems that if it wished to
exercise this power solely in terms of price, it could charge a price for Windows substantially
above that which could be charged in a competitive market.").
232. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 461-62 (discussing each prong of the Jefferson
Parish four-prong per se test); see also discussion supra Part I.A-B.
233. Id.
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its licensing agreements with OEMs such as Dell and Compaq, Microsoft
required that IE be installed with Windows. 34 Moreover, in writing the
code for Windows, Microsoft made IE permanent on all of its operating
systems.235 The mandatory integration of irremovable browser software,
coupled with the fact that Microsoft maintained a monopoly in the
operating system market for virtually all Intel-based personal computers,
means that anyone who bought such a system-irrespective of the OEM
involved-received IE already installed as the Internet browser, regardless
of the buyer's browser preference. 36 Whether consumers were forced to
pay additional money for the installation of IE is arguably irrelevant
because they did not choose the software in the first place.
d. Microsoft's Bundling of IE with Windows Was Not Beneficial
Any market benefit from Microsoft's bundling practices was
overshadowed by the corporation's complete dominance of the operating
systems marketplace.237 Under the third prong of the Jefferson Parish per
se analysis, courts should inquire into the relevant market structure to
determine if there are situations in which strong benefits associated with
bundling outweigh its costs to competition.2 38 The court should look first
to see whether the tying arrangement hindered a substantial amount of
commerce, then see if any benefit could outweigh this hindrance.239 Under
this third prong, Microsoft, or a similarly situated corporation, could argue
that the benefits of the tying arrangement justify the conduct, though the
inquiry under this test is more limited than in the rule of reason
approach.2 40 Nevertheless, the court should be wary of any benefit when
the defendant is such a dominant market player.
Microsoft argued that integration was the industry custom, that non-
removal of IE from Windows was required because of its significant
investment in the integration, and that Windows would lose its platform
234. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 60-61 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that
Microsoft prohibited OEMs from "removing any desktop icons, folders, or 'Start' menu entries").
235. See id. at 64-89.
236. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999).
237. See id.
238. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16; see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp.
2d 30, 50-51 (D.D.C. 2000).
239. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16; Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462.
240. See Monopolies, supra note 5, § 92 (explaining that a rule of reason approach allows
plaintiffs the room to more thoroughly justify bundling based on "the purposes and effects of the
practices involved").
FIT TO BE TIED
functionality for third-party software without this bundling. 241  When
looking at the benefits offered, the court must consider Microsoft's
dominant position in the operating systems marketplace, as well as the fact
that Netscape charged licensing fees for its browser up until Microsoft
integrated IE.242 From a skeptical viewpoint, it appears that Microsoft
merely used its leverage to foreclose on competition in the Internet browser
market. Though integration may have been "industry custom,
243
Microsoft still held a ninety-five percent share of the operating system
market, leaving a miniscule portion of the industry to which the court could
24compare its practices. 4 Similarly, Microsoft's argument that investment
of resources into integration justified its software bundling also fails
because Microsoft is one of the few corporations expending resources on
such projects.245 What company would independently expend resources
investigating integration into Microsoft's proprietary product?
Microsoft failed to meet its burden to establish that the benefit for the
bundling practices outweighed the adverse effects to consumers,
competitors, and an efficient market.246 In rejecting the Jefferson Parish
per se analysis in favor of a rule of reason approach, the circuit court held
that more economic efficiency analysis was necessary, especially in the
platform software market.247 Microsoft, as the dominant player in the tying
product market with Windows, was only entitled to a minimal analysis
under the per se rule.248 A mandated rule of reason in every similar case
will increase judicial confusion and expenditures of time and money while
failing to probe for economic efficiencies. 249  Giant corporations, like
Microsoft, have other ways-namely advertising-of getting their
innovations across without requiring the tying of products like IE to
Windows.250
241. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 88-90 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
242. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 44 (D.D.C. 1999) ("Netscape
charged customers to license Navigator, and that Netscape derived a significant portion of its
revenue from selling browser licenses.").
243. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
244. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999).
245. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
246. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 50 (D.D.C. 2000).
247. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
248. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999).
249. See Turner, supra note 188.
250. See Greg Johnson, New Microsoft Ad Campaign Targets AOL, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2000, at C4 (discussing Microsoft's $150 million expenditure to push its online service,
Microsoft Network, as an alternative to America Online); see also Diane Seo, With Lather of Ads,
Gillette Seeks Sharper Edge, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 1998, at DI ("Microsoft set the record for
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C. Recent Developments in the Wake of the Circuit Court Decision
The circuit court ultimately reversed the section 1 violation against
Microsoft and remanded that claim back to the district court 25  The court
rejected the Jefferson Parish per se rule in favor of a rule of reason inquiry
for tying allegations involving platform software. 2  However, two months
after the circuit court decision, the D.O.J. announced that it would not seek
to pursue its tying claim.253 Additionally, the D.O.J. said it would no
longer push for a breakup of the software giant.254
Though some called the D.O.J.'s decision "sensible" to end the long-
running antitrust litigation that would have resulted on remand, 55
opponents voiced strong sentiment against the D.O.J.'s decisions, claiming
that the government gave away its trump card for purposes of settlement.
5 6
Because the D.O.J. backed down from its central argument, it was rather
limited in the remedies it could seek in settlement. Having lost all
prospects of Microsoft's breakup into two corporations, the government
was left with ineffective conduct remedies.257 The parties ultimately settled
the antitrust claims in November 2001,258 but the remedies obtained left
states and competing software vendors feeling as though they had been
cheated.259
The tying law analysis that has existed since International Salt Co. v.
United States26° was designed to take potential economic efficiencies into
account. 26' Therefore, where it was clear that a corporation's leverage was
being used for anti-competitive purposes, little deference would be given
promotional spending, shelling out an estimated $1 billion to tout Windows 95 software ... .
251. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
252. Id.




256. See, e.g., Labaton, supra note 17.
257. See id. ("Microsoft has flaunted conduct remedies for years.").
258. Edmund Sanders, Microsoft Settlement Stirs Debate, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2001, at CI
(outlining the settlement agreement between Microsoft and the D.O.J.). The agreement imposes
an affirmative duty on Microsoft to let independent software vendors develop competing Internet
browsers. Id. Furthermore, Microsoft is required to provide the Windows code so that its
competitors can design their software to emulate Windows. Id.
259. Id. ("AOL Time Warner Inc. said the settlement will do little to promote competition
or rein in Microsoft's anti-competitive conduct.").
260. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
261. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14; see also Turner, supranote 188.
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262and minimal inquiry made into market structure. It was only when a
corporation lacked market power that it received a lengthy inquiry.263
Whether a Republican administration that favors big business and
"never really cared for the breakup order," or a "president who has voiced
impatience over protracted lawsuits" 264 had any bearing on the circuit
court's determination is beyond the scope of this Note. What is clear,
however, is that had the D.O.J. not dropped the claim, a rule of reason
analysis would have dragged this case out even farther than the four plus
years of its life.
V. CONCLUSION
The Microsoft Appeal court erred by concluding that a rule of reason
analysis was necessary in all tying allegations within the growing platform
software market.265 The court's overbroad generalization of cases will only
lead to confusion among lower courts and great time and expense to
determine the proper application of the standards set forth under that
approach. Moreover, the Microsoft Appeal decision allows software giants
to escape liability for using their leverage to push software onto consumers,
and to drive competitors out of business.266
The Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde267 decision laid
out effective guidelines for courts applying the per se tying test. This four-
prong analysis is not a truly per se analysis because a court faced with tying
allegations must inquire into any benefits that bundling practices might
268create. However, unlike the rule of reason test, per se inquiry is limited
and is applied with a skeptical eye because the defendant corporation is
likely to have used its market power illegally to promote its tied product.269
Because of the Microsoft Appeal decision and the D.O.J.'s failure to
proceed in the case, Microsoft gained a significant windfall at the expense
of its consumers.27 ° On remand, the district court may have been forced to
look deeper into the market conditions to decide if the benefits proposed
262. See Monopolies, supra note 5, § 91.
263. See id. § 90.
264. Labaton, supra note 17.
265. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
266. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 47-51 (D.D.C. 2000)
(explaining how Microsoft used leverage to hinder competition).
267. 466 U.S. 2, 18 (1984).
268. See Monopolies, supra note 5, § 91.
269. See id.
270. See generally, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
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actually outweighed any detriment to competition. However, because the
D.O.J. chose not to proceed with the case, it is hard to say whether
Microsoft will ever be put in its proper place by the courts.
Christopher P. Campbell*
*This Note is dedicated to my parents, Ronald and Phyllis, my sister, Cynthia, and my
grandparents for their endless love and support; to Charles, Elena, and Tim for their guidance and
confidence in me; and especially to Tiffiny, for allowing me to be part of her life and encouraging
me to succeed. I would also like to extend my gratitude to the editors and staff of the Loyola of
Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review, particularly Tom Werner, Brian E. Pellis, Leah Phillips
Falzone, Graham B. Smith, Tabitha Rainey, Erika Brauch, Carmen Snuggs, and Gil Dan for their
advice, effort, and patience. Finally, I would like to thank Professor Sean M. Scott for her
insightful critique of this Note.
